Amicus Request(s) Approved at the January 16, 2020 Committee Meeting

Commonwealth Long, SJC-12868
The Supreme Judicial Court sought the following amicus solicitation:
In the context of a motion to suppress evidence, where the defendant driver alleges that race was a factor in the traffic stop at issue, and challenges the traffic stop based on equal protection ground, whether pursuant to Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425 (1996), the defendant driver produced “sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference,” id. At 442, that the traffic stop at issue “is the product of the selective enforcement predicated on race,” id. At 440; whether the framework outlined in Commonwealth v. Lora, 451 Mass. 425 (1996), for addressing the issue of pretextual traffic stops motivated by race should be revised; what standard should be applied to the determination whether a hearing is required.
Commonwealth v. Christopher Rambert, Appeals Court No. 2018-P-1282
The Youth Advocacy Division sought and received approval to file an amicus letter in support of the juvenile’s application for further appellate review and if the application for FAR is granted, to file an amicus brief in the full court. The letter would urge the court to grant FAR to clarify the following points: 1) that a Miller hearing is required in every case where the juvenile’s parole eligibility exceeds fifteen years, unless, upon a motion for resentencing, the parties stipulate to a term that allows for parole eligibility for fifteen years or less; and 2) that whether a prole hearing has occurred is irrelevant to the matrix of Miller factors the court must consider when resentencing under Perez II. Instead, at the Miller hearing, it is the Commonwealth’s burden to prove that “both the crimes themselves and the characteristics of the juvenile present extraordinary circumstances justifying harsher treatment.” Perez II, 480 Mass. at 547. 3) Finally, the letter will suggest that the implication of the Appeals Court’s decision in the defendant’s case is that a parole hearing may be a substitute for a Miller hearing, and this conclusion is erroneous and contrary to the SJC’s decision in Perez I and Perez II.
Commonwealth J.S., A Juvenile, Appeals Court No. 2019-P-1645
The Youth Advocacy Division sought and received approval to file an amicus letter in support of an application for direct appellate review (DAR) and to file an amicus brief to the full court. The case presents the question of whether article 14 requires the court of the Commonwealth to reduce the weight given to typical behavior of black children when interacting with the Boston Police Department in the reasonable suspicion analysis. The amicus letter would 1) argue that the case provides an opportunity for the Court to further consider the role race plays in the search and seizure analysis; 2) highlight the importance of the SJC continuing to take opportunities to address racism in policing; and 3) argue that the consideration at the heart of the Warren decision should apply more broadly to the reasonable suspicion analysis, because racism pervasively infects policing.
Commonwealth C.C., A Juvenile, No. SJ-2019-0511; Commonwealth v. A.D., A Juvenile, No. SJ-2019-0513; Commonwealth v. E.R., A Juvenile, No. SJ-2019-0512; and Commonwealth v. D.J., A Juvenile, No. SJ-2019-0510.
The Youth Advocacy Division sought and received approval to file an amicus letter urging the Single Justice to reverse and report to the full bench certain issues raised in the Commonwealth’s G.L. c.211, §3 petitions in the four co-defendant cases and if reported to the full court, to file an amicus brief on the cases.
The amicus letter would suggest that juvenile court judges, clerk’s offices and practitioners need additional guidance on Wallace W., hearings. If the questions are reserved and reported, the amicus brief would argue the following: 1) that a prearraignment Wallace W. evidentiary hearing must occur where there is a multi-count complaint that alleges a “minor misdemeanor offense along with felonies or “major” misdemeanors and 2) to sustain its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the Commonwealth cannot rely on hearsay but must present the testimony of witnesses.
Commonwealth Bohigian, SJC-12858
The Supreme Judicial Court issued the following amicus solicitation:
“Where G.L. c. 90, §24(1) (e)and (f) provide that when an individual is arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, a blood analysis test made by or at the direction of a police officer must be done with the individual’s consent and that if no consent is given, the test shall not be done, whether if the police officer secures a warrant for the test, on the basis of probable cause, the test can be performed regardless whether the individual has consented.”The cases primarily involves issues of statutory interpretation, and also implicates constitutional and policy questions which could have far reaching implications in operating under the influence cases and beyond.